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A decade after the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the Children's Internet Protection Act, which
mandated Internet filters in public libraries, filtering problems have not been resolved, and the disabling of
Internet filters upon the requests of adults does not seem to be as easy or automatic as the justices had presumed. In
upholding CIPA, the Supreme Court seemed to misunderstand the parameters of the disabling provision, ignored
the right-to-receive doctrine, and missed the opportunity to update public forum doctrine to include the Internet.
This article concludes that the Court needs to reevaluate public forum doctrine in the context of twenty-first
century technology and designate Internet access in public libraries as a metaphysical public forum.
For more than a century, the American public library's mission has been to serve the information and educational
needs of society, 1  with open and equal access for all patrons. 2  For those needs to be served, patrons must have
access to information. The First Amendment right of free speech has a corollary right that applies not only to
society at large, but also to *64  public libraries: the right to receive information and ideas. The Supreme Court
of the United States has clearly recognized this right-to-receive doctrine in a line of cases, including the first two
of the three library-cases it decided. However, the Supreme Court chose to ignore the right to receive doctrine
in its third library case, United States v. American Library Association 3  in 2003, when the Court upheld the
Children's Internet Protection Act, even though the American Library Association argued in its brief that the case
“fundamentally” involved the right of library patrons to receive online information. 4  The lower federal court,
which had struck down CIPA as unconstitutional, stated, “‘The right to receive information is vigorously enforced
in the context of a public library.”’ 5
Under the Children's Internet Protection Act of 2000, public libraries -- and most schools 6  -- receiving federal
funding are required to implement an Internet safety policy 7  and install “a technology protection measure,” such
as blocking or filtering software, on all computers connected to the Internet to block or filter images that are
obscene, involve child pornography, or are considered “harmful to minors.” 8  The safety *65  policy requires
libraries and schools to monitor minors' online activities and to monitor the operation of “a technology protection
measure.” 9  In 2012, just as in 2003, the only “technology protection measure” available is blocking and filtering
software. CIPA states that librarians “may disable” the filtering technology “to enable access for bona fide research
or other lawful purpose(s),” 10  although the law does not require librarians to do so and does not define “lawful
purposes.”
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A decade after the Supreme Court upheld CIPA, filtering problems have not been resolved and the disabling
of Internet filters upon the requests of adults does not seem to be as easy or automatic as the justices had
presumed. In 2012, a federal district court in Washington granted summary judgment to a library district that
refused adults' requests to turn off Internet filters, stating that the practice did not violate the First Amendment. 11
While commentators have written extensively about the Children's Internet Protection Act, this article will fill a
gap in the literature by discussing the 2012 court case challenging CIPA, the problem with the voluntary Internet
filter disabling provision, and the need for the Supreme Court to designate the Internet as a new type of forum:
a metaphysical public forum.
To provide context for those arguments, this article first will discuss the history and mission of the American
public library. Next, it will discuss the First Amendment right-to-receive doctrine, including the Supreme Court
cases upholding the right to receive. Third, the article will examine the only three library cases decided by the
Supreme Court, including the CIPA case, and the one case challenging CIPA. Fourth, the article will discuss the
status of Internet filtering technology and its applicability to the public library's mission. The article concludes
*66  that the Court needs to reevaluate public forum doctrine in the context of twenty-first century technology,
designate Internet access as a metaphysical and inherent public forum, and apply that forum to public libraries.
THE HISTORY AND MISSION OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LIBRARY
The Supreme Court's decision to uphold the Children's Internet Protection Act had a significant impact on the
American public library's mission, which focuses on providing patrons with access to diverse information. Public
libraries in the United States have existed for more than 150 years. The nation's first large tax-supported municipal
library, the Boston Public Library, opened in 1854 and served as a model for future public libraries in three
major ways: by providing open access to all individuals, by allowing all residents to borrow materials, and by
designing a separate children's reading room. 12  The number of public libraries greatly expanded during the 1890s
and early 1900s after philanthropist Andrew Carnegie began donating millions of dollars for the construction
of municipal libraries across the nation, according to library scholar and historian Evelyn Geller. 13  In most
states, public libraries are supported by taxes, primarily local property taxes. 14  Funding for libraries also can
come from federal and state appropriations, intangible taxes, government lotteries, and private family, foundation
and corporate funds. 15  Local boards of trustees oversee most public libraries. A board determines the overall
purposes, objectives and policies of the library; provides budgetary advice; and works with public officials,
library associations and local residents to provide quality library services. 16  According to the American Library
Association, trustees also are expected to support librarians in resisting an individual's or group's *67  censorship
attempts. 17  Public libraries often have provided open and equal access to all materials and to all users, 18  with the
goal of combating censorship and thus preserving an individual's right to choose reading and viewing materials. 19
Even before the emergence of the Internet, public libraries faced varying degrees of trouble with censorship,
attempts at community control, and funding. 20  During the latter part of the nineteenth century, intellectual
freedom was not a goal of tax-funded public libraries. In the 1880s, most librarians focused on the occupational
and cultural needs of patrons and did not oppose moral censorship, though mostly out of fear of losing their
positions, according to Geller. 21  As the profession of librarianship became more established in the early 1900s,
public librarians began to embrace neutrality and impartiality. By the 1930s, an ideology of freedom emerged
in the library profession, 22  and the ALA began developing a set of resolutions emphasizing the importance of
providing a variety of viewpoints in library materials and challenging censorship. 23  Subsequently, the ALA
started promoting “man's freedom to seek the truth where and how he will,” writes Jean Key Gates, the author
of a leading textbook on librarianship. 24
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The ALA formally adopted a bill of rights in 1939. 25  The ALA's Library Bill of Rights, which was amended
several times, states that “libraries should challenge censorship in the fulfillment of their responsibility to provide
information and enlightenment” 26  and “libraries should cooperate with all persons and groups concerned with
resisting abridgment of free expression and free access to ideas.” 27  In 1953, the American Library Association and
the American Book Publishers Association *68  jointly prepared and adopted the “Freedom to Read Statement,”
which they have since revised several times. 28  The statement stresses the importance of reading in a democratic
society 29  and the responsibility of librarians and publishers in protecting the freedom to read, providing access
to a diversity of ideas, and opposing censorship. 30
The mission of the public library today, as it was in most of the twentieth century, is to support the educational,
social and information needs of society, to promote self-education, and to satisfy the tastes of the popular culture,
according to library scholar Richard Rubin and First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla. 31  Two other library
scholars have called libraries central to political, social and intellectual freedom. 32  The function of the public
library is to provide materials to meet its constituents' needs for information, education, self-realization, recreation
and cultural growth. 33  Libraries are places where readers can “fulfil [sic] any personal, professional or political
aspiration.” 34  In addition, librarians tend to hold common values, including commitment to service, respect for
truth and the search for truth (including protecting and defending many points of view), and tolerance for multiple
perspectives on any given subject. 35  The mission of the American public library has been to support intellectual
freedom and to provide open and equal access to all patrons and to all users, 36  regardless of whether information
*69  was delivered in print, microfilm, audio recordings, video recordings or online. 37
In the twenty-first century, Internet access at public libraries has expanded, thus leading to an expansion in patrons'
access to information. Public computer and Wi-Fi use increased at more than 70% of U.S. public libraries in
2009-10, with two-thirds of the libraries reporting that they are the only provider of free public access to computers
and the Internet in their communities. In a 2011 survey, 83% of adults reported that it was very important or
important that their public library provide computer access, training and support, up seven percentage points from
2010. 38  During a period of continuing high unemployment in 2011, as the economy continued to recover from
the recession, the demand for free and varied public library services increased, 39  including Internet access. 40
In 2012, public libraries continue to serve as multi-purpose social institutions for both self-improvement and
entertainment and a place for patrons to access diverse information and ideas. Librarians who refuse to disable
filters for adults hinder adult patrons' access to protected online speech.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO RECEIVE INFORMATION AND IDEAS
First Amendment scholars and the Supreme Court have emphasized the importance of the right to receive,
including in the context of public libraries. Thomas Emerson stated that there is a First Amendment right to
receive and obtain communication, independent of or supplemental to the right of the speaker to communicate
information. 41  He argued the “right to read, listen, or see is so elemental” that it deserves full First Amendment
protection. 42  This “right to know” is of “vital importance in a democratic society” 43  and is an affirmative right,
in contrast to the negative right of being free from government *70  interference. 44  In Professor Emerson's view,
the right to know is necessary for self-fulfillment and should receive “direct constitutional protection.” 45  To
attain self-fulfillment, or self-realization, Emerson said an individual has “the right to form his own beliefs and
opinions ... and the right to express these beliefs and opinions.” 46  According to Emerson, the “suppression of
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belief, opinion and expression is an affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man's essential nature.” 47  A public
library provides the environment for patrons to access new ideas and information that helps to develop opinions
and beliefs and contributes to individual self-fulfillment.
First Amendment scholar William Lee, writing generally about the right to receive information and ideas, stated
that this doctrine is important and useful because it “restricts the government's power to interfere with the recipient
of the communication.” 48  However, Lee wrote that the Supreme Court has failed to develop “a cohesive theory
of free speech” or to tie the right to receive information and ideas to the recipient, independent of the speaker. 49
Although the Supreme Court has stated that the right to receive is well established, 50  Lee said the Court has never
explained the theoretical foundation of that right. 51  In a 1987 article, Lee wrote that part of the problem is the
Court developed the right-to-receive doctrine in various contexts 52  and for “disparate purposes,” 53  including
upholding the right to receive political speech, even though it was communist propaganda from abroad; 54
upholding the right to receive commercial speech in the form of advertising prescription drug prices; 55  and
upholding the right of public school students to have access *71  to school library books by striking down a school
board decision to remove certain books from the library. 56  Lee argued it would make more sense to recognize the
right to receive information only in situations where a speaker has a right to speak. 57  Using Lee's analysis, the
right to receive ideas and information might not apply in public libraries if speakers were viewed as not having
the right to speak in that venue, 58  although other scholars disagree.
One such First Amendment scholar, Rodney Smolla, wrote that the First Amendment protects not only individual
self-expression, but also the right to receive information and ideas in libraries. 59  He argued that librarians have to
show commitment in maintaining “intellectual openness” in public libraries. 60  “Librarians play a pivotal role in
maintaining the free flow of information in American society,” Smolla wrote. 61  He wrote he was “disappointed
that courts have not gone very far in devising First Amendment doctrines that more fully protect the intellectual
neutrality of libraries.” 62  He wrote, “[N]ew communications technologies carry with them increased censorship
pressures” and urged librarians to fight against censorship in what he called “the never ending struggle to maintain
the free flow of information in a wide-open and robust democracy.” 63  Although Internet access was not widely
available when Smolla's article was published, his argument applies directly to online access in public libraries
because the Internet is a new communication technology that promotes a free flow of information and ideas.
A decade later, another legal scholar stated that Internet access in public libraries plays a crucial role in the right
to receive information and in the exchange of ideas. Professor Marc Blitz described the public library as a place
“where open access for the public follows logically *72  from the mission of the institution.” 64  Blitz argued the
right to receive information, including online content, 65  applies to public libraries because patrons can retrieve
information that leads to self-fulfillment and autonomy. 66
In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized the right-to-receive doctrine as an important corollary of freedom
of speech. In a series of cases decided over five decades, the Court has held that the First Amendment protects not
only the right to distribute information, but also the right to receive information and ideas. 67  The Court first clearly
articulated a right to receive information and ideas during the 1960s, according to Professor Lee. 68  However, the
Court directly referred to the right to receive ideas in two cases decided in the 1940s: the right of residents to hear
messages distributed door to door 69  and the right *73  of potential union members to listen to union organizers'
messages. 70  The Court subsequently upheld the right-to-receive doctrine in other contexts, including the right of
the recipients of overseas communist literature to have the material delivered by the U.S. Postal Service without
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returning a special reply card prior to delivery, 71  the right of patients to receive information on contraception from
their health care providers, 72  and the right of pharmacists to advertise prescription drug prices so that consumers
could make informed decisions based on those prices. 73  In the contraception case, decided in 1965, the Court
struck down a Connecticut law that criminalized the use of contraceptives and the distribution of information on
contraception to married and single individuals. 74  In Griswold v. Connecticut, 75  Justice William Douglas wrote,
“The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute,
the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach.” 76  Four
years later, the Court acknowledged the right-to-receive precedent: “It is now well established that the Constitution
protects the right to receive information and ideas ... (and) this right to receive information and ideas, regardless
of their social worth, is fundamental to our free society.” 77  Then, in 1976, the Court first applied the right-to-
receive doctrine to purely commercial speech when it struck down a law prohibiting the advertising of prescription
drug prices. 78  The Court stated that advertising deserves First Amendment protection and the First Amendment
protects consumers' interest in the free flow of *74  information, as such information is indispensable to well-
informed private economic decisions. 79  Justice Harry Blackmun wrote for the Court: “This Court has referred to
a First Amendment right to ‘receive information and ideas' .... If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal
right to receive the advertising.” 80
LIBRARY CHALLENGES REACH THE COURTS
Despite the Court's acknowledgement of the importance of the right to receive over a forty-year period, the Court
plurality did not acknowledge the right in its opinion upholding CIPA, even though the Court had addressed that
right in ALA's two previous library decisions. However, the right-to-receive doctrine was mentioned briefly in
one of its two concurring opinions 81  and in one of ALA's two dissenting opinions. 82  The Court did not refer
to its previous two library decisions at all in the CIPA opinion: The first case involved public libraries, and the
second case involved public school libraries.
In the Court's first library case, decided in 1966 during the Civil Rights era, the issue was physical access to public
libraries. In Brown v. Louisiana, 83  the plurality overturned the convictions of five African-American men who
were convicted of breach of peace after staging a peaceful and silent protest against segregation in the Clinton,
Louisiana, branch of the Audubon Public Library. 84  The five men stayed in the library for ten or fifteen minutes
and refused to leave when librarians asked them to do so. 85  African-Americans were not allowed to use the
libraries or the red bookmobile that served whites. 86  They were only allowed to use the blue bookmobile, which
served Negroes. 87  In *75  writing the plurality opinion, Justice Abe Fortas stated that the convictions violated
the First Amendment rights of the protesters. He wrote that the government may regulate the use of libraries, but
it cannot do so in a discriminatory manner. In referring to the role of the public library, he wrote, “It is an unhappy
circumstance that the locus of these events was a public library -- a place dedicated to quiet, to knowledge, and to
beauty.” 88  Although Justice Fortas' statement did not directly refer to the right to receive doctrine, his reference
to “knowledge” implies the right-to-receive information and ideas in public libraries, 89  for without exposure to
information, one cannot gain knowledge.
In the Court's second library case, decided in 1982, the removal of books from public school libraries was at
issue. In Board of Education v. Pico, 90  the Court held that a school board violated the First Amendment when it
ordered the removal of books from a junior high school library and a senior high school library. The school board
described the books as “anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy.” 91  Justice William
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Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, stating, “[T]he right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender's
First Amendment right to send them: ‘The right of freedom of speech and press ... embraces the right to distribute
literature, and necessarily protects the right to receive it.”’ 92  Justice Brennan wrote that the right to receive ideas
and information “is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press,
and political freedom.” 93
In a dissenting opinion, Justice William Rehnquist distinguished school libraries from public libraries, stating
that the right to receive information in schools is not supported by Court precedent. 94  He did not *76  address
the right-to-receive doctrine in the CIPA case. In Pico, Rehnquist wrote, “Unlike university or public libraries,
elementary and secondary school libraries are not designed for freewheeling inquiry; they are tailored, as the
public school curriculum is tailored, to the teaching of basic skills and ideas.” 95
Although Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the plurality decision in Pico, his statement on “freewheeling inquiry”
supports the public library's mission in providing access to a wide variety of information and ideas. However, in
writing the ALA opinion, Rehnquist did not cite his dissent in Pico.
In 2003, the ALA Court used congressional spending power as the rationale for upholding the law. 96  The Court
held that the CIPA did not impose an ““unconstitutional condition” on public libraries. 97  The government can
define the parameters of the programs that it funds and “insist that these “public funds be spent for the purposes
for which they were authorized,”' the plurality opinion stated. 98  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that libraries must
have broad discretion in deciding what material to acquire for patrons. 99  The “traditional role” for public libraries
is “identifying suitable and worthwhile material; it is no less entitled to play that role when it collects material
from the Internet than when it collects material from any other source,” Rehnquist wrote. 100
The plurality opinion held that CIPA did not violate the First Amendment. First, the Court said public forum
doctrine 101  did not apply to public libraries, and librarians were not engaging in prior restraint in *77  their role
in making acquisition decisions. In evaluating CIPA in the context of the First Amendment fora doctrine, Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote, “Internet access in public libraries is neither a ‘traditional’ nor a ‘designated’ public
forum.” 102  He wrote that Internet access in public libraries is not a traditional public forum because it has not been
“immemorially held in trust” for use by the public for communication. He also wrote that Internet access in public
libraries is not a limited public forum because the government did not intentionally take action to designate it as
such. 103  Second, the plurality held that the prior restraint doctrine does not extend to collection decisions made
by public libraries. 104  The plurality reasoned that a library's decision to use filtering software is not a restraint
on private speech, but rather a collection decision, and public libraries are not required to add material to their
collections just because the material is constitutionally protected. 105
Justice Stephen Breyer concurred, writing that the Court has long recognized the right to receive information and
ideas. 106  Breyer wrote that because “[t]he Act directly restricts the public's receipt of information,” he would
apply “heightened scrutiny,” rather than strict scrutiny or rational basis, in analyzing CIPA. 107
The two dissenting opinions did not address public forum doctrine, although one dissent addressed the right-to-
receive doctrine. 108  Both dissents argued that CIPA violated the First Amendment. Justice John Paul Stevens
wrote that CIPA constitutes “a significant prior restraint” because some libraries' procedures would make it
difficult for patrons to have the filtering disabled 109  and most of the filtered content was *78  “constitutionally
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protected speech.” 110  He wrote that CIPA violated the First Amendment because it required filters to be installed
on all computers with Internet access, not just those computers funded with E-rate discounts. 111
Justice David Souter wrote that mandatory filtering constitutes censorship because filtering technology blocks
access to electronic resources that the library has already acquired. 112  Moreover, because filtering software is
proprietary, Justice Souter wrote, only software developers know exactly which material has been blocked. Even
though librarians could select categories -- such as nudity or violence -- to block, they would not know the actual
content blocked in each category. 113  He also wrote that the CIPA's blocking mandate was an invalid exercise
of Congress's spending power because CIPA “mandates action by recipient libraries that would violate the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech if the libraries took that action entirely on their own.” 114  In addressing
the right-to-receive doctrine, Souter wrote, “There is no good reason, then, to treat blocking of adult enquiry as
anything different from the censorship it presumptively is.” 115  However, Justice Souter wrote that he would have
upheld the law if the mandatory filtering applied only to minors. 116
The disabling filter provision of CIPA was a key factor for the Court in upholding the law and was discussed
by the plurality, both concurrences and one of the two dissents. The plurality noted that the Constitution does
not guarantee individuals freedom from embarrassment or inconvenience when accessing information at public
libraries 117  and viewed the disabling provision as a major factor in upholding the law's constitutionality:
*79  Assuming that such erroneous blocking presents constitutional difficulties, any such
concerns are dispelled by the ease with which patrons may have the filtering software disabled.
When a patron encounters a blocked site, he need only ask a librarian to unblock it or (at least
in the case of adults) disable the filter. 118
Justice Anthony Kennedy based his concurring opinion on the enabling provision of CIPA, writing that “there is
little to this case” because the provision would allow libraries to turn off filtering software and unblock specific
websites for adults in a timely manner. 119  Justice Kennedy wrote that, although CIPA is not unconstitutional
on its face, an adult could challenge the statute on an as- applied basis if the filtering could not be removed in a
timely manner. 120  In a separate concurrence, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote, “[T]he adult patron need only ask a
librarian to unblock the specific Web site or, alternatively, ask the librarian, ‘Please disable the entire filter.”’ 121
Justice Stevens wrote that the assurance that librarians could choose to disable the filters upon request “does not
cure the constitutional infirmity in the statute.” 122
CIPA has been challenged on an as-applied basis only once, with the case revolving around the law's Internet filter
disabling provision. In 2012, in Bradburn v. North Central Regional Library District, 123  a federal district court
granted a library district's motion for summary judgment, stating that the refusal of public librarians to disable
Internet filters upon the request of adults did not violate the First Amendment. 124  The court used the rational basis
standard in making its decision, stating that librarians are entitled to make content-based collection development
decisions when deciding what material to provide to patrons. 125  The court wrote that it was “reasonable for [the
library district] to develop an Internet policy that can be implemented consistently throughout its twenty-eight
branches.” 126  The court held, “Blocking Internet sites and pages that contain constitutionally-protected material
deemed suitable only for adults helps ensure that the environment at NCRL libraries is consistent with its mission
of providing learning and research opportunities for individuals of all ages.” 127
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*80  Two years earlier, the case had been remanded to the Washington Supreme Court because the plaintiffs
challenging the filtering policy had argued the Washington Constitution provided a higher level of speech
protection than the First Amendment. In a 6-3 decision, the state supreme court held that the library district did
not violate the state constitution either in establishing a policy that Internet filters not be disabled for adults or in
refusing to turn off filters upon the request of adults. 128  The court viewed the decision to filter as a collection
decision rather than the removal of content 129  and saw the filtering policy as viewpoint neutral. 130  A dissenting
opinion argued that there was no reason to install an Internet filtering system that could not be easily disabled at
the request of an adult and that eight members of the Supreme Court had found the disabling provision of CIPA
to be “constitutionally critical.” 131  The opinion cited a 1974 Washington state supreme court decision, which
stated, “Freedom of speech without the corollary -- freedom to receive -- would seriously discount the intendment,
purpose and effect of the first amendment [sic].” 132
FILTERING TECHNOLOGY AND THE PUBLIC LIBRARY
A library patron's ability to access material in public libraries is directly related to the librarian's role in determining
which materials to add to the library's collection, including online resources. Because Internet filtering software
is proprietary, however, librarians do not have input into online acquisition decisions. 133  When librarians select
Internet filtering software, they are not able to base their choices on the library's collection development policies,
as they do in acquiring books and other resources. In choosing commercial filtering software, librarians are not
able to determine if the filters meet their needs because software companies do not disclose their standards. 134
Librarians have *81  no way of knowing exactly which content has been blocked in any given category, as the
district court noted in 2002 in striking down the Children's Internet Protection Act of 2000. 135  Moreover, the
software's erroneous interpretation of key words and images can block Web sites that provide non-sexual visual
material and information, such as Web sites on health care, gay and lesbian issues, and animal welfare. In addition,
filtering technology is imprecise in that it does not block all sexual content. 136
Another major problem with CIPA's filtering requirement is the disconnect between the categories of the statute
and the categories of images that filtering software is able to block. CIPA prevents access to visual images that
are obscene, child pornography or harmful to minors. 137  However, Internet filters are not able to clearly discern
what images would meet the criteria of these three categories. During the first decade of the twenty-first century,
researchers reported that while Internet filtering technology can be effective in blocking access to a large amount
of pornography, it is not a panacea. In 2003, the year the Supreme Court decided the CIPA case, the American
Library Association stated that filters still were not sophisticated enough to distinguish pornography from art or
literature. 138  Prior to making this determination, the ALA had reviewed findings of numerous studies, including
those conducted by the National Research Council and the Kaiser Family Foundation. The studies showed that
filters failed to block many sites banned under CIPA, as well as overblocked hundreds of thousands of legal and
useful sites. 139
In 2008, in the most recent comprehensive study of Internet filters, the Deloitte research team evaluated twenty-six
filtering software programs and found that filtering technology had improved, especially in blocking pornography.
Nonetheless, the Deloitte report showed that while a less restrictive filter setting would allow access to more
“good” content, the filter would not block as much “bad” content. Conversely, a more restrictive setting would
block more “bad” content, but at the *82  same time erroneously prevent access to more “good” content.
In defining sexual content, the Deloitte study labeled content as “bad” if the text or pictures “could impair”
minors' sexual development and “may have a traumatising [sic] effect on youngsters,” such as “sex accompanied
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by pain, injury or humiliation” and “hardcore sex, ejaculation, erection, defecation, urination, bestiality, [and]
necrophilia.” 140
Meanwhile, anecdotal reports on the use of filtering programs in K-12 classrooms in the United States suggest
problems on the reliance of proprietary software, whether in schools or public libraries. 141  In 2008, teachers found
that Web sites were blocked on topics that were completely appropriate for students' schoolwork. For example,
high school students in the Midwest complained that all Google search results and all blogs were blocked. 142
A middle school teacher in the Midwest, who had assigned animal research papers, reported that the San Diego
Zoo and University of Michigan Zoological Museum Web sites were blocked. The teacher also reported that a
student could not access a map of Canada when trying to do a social studies assignment. 143  A Wisconsin library
media specialist reported that students doing research on their favorite guitar players found everything about their
musicians blocked. 144  In each case, teachers and librarians did not know why the Web sites were blocked.
Because CIPA applies to public libraries as well as schools, library scholars Paul Jaeger and Zheng Yan questioned
the appropriateness of adult library patrons and librarians being restricted to the same level of Internet access as
children. 145  The public library's overarching mission is to provide open and equal access to all materials and users.
Because of this mission, most librarians have a major philosophical problem with Internet filters. 146  Moreover,
the First Amendment right to receive doctrine supports open Internet access in public libraries for adults.
*83  ANALYSIS
In upholding CIPA, the Supreme Court seemed to misunderstand the parameters of the disabling provision, ignored
the right-to-receive doctrine, and missed the opportunity to update public forum doctrine to include the Internet.
Although the Bradburn 147  case is limited in scope, it indicates that the disabling of Internet filters in public
libraries may not be as automatic or timely as the Supreme Court had anticipated when upholding CIPA. The
solicitor general had assured the justices that filters would be disabled upon request and in a timely manner, but
the text of the law states that librarians have the choice as to whether they will disable filters. 148  The Bradburn
case illustrates the dichotomy between CIPA's wording and the solicitor general's assertion that librarians would
readily turn off filters at the request of adults.
There are no recent studies on requests to disable Internet filters or on requests to allow access to specific Web
sites in public libraries. However, the Bradburn case, a 2008 case study, and a 2004 survey shed some light on
filter disabling issues. In Bradburn, the library district reported that it had received ninety-two requests to unblock
access to specific Web sites and pages over a five-month period in 2008, which is different than turning off filters
for unfettered Internet searches. The library district responded to eight requests within one hour, nineteen within
the same day, twenty-nine the next day, twenty within three days, and five other requests more than three days
later. No information was provided on the eleven remaining requests. 149  Nonetheless, the delay in responding to
the majority of requests would result in patrons needing to make a second trip to the library, often on a different
day, which does not meet the timeliness factor the Supreme Court emphasized. Even though librarians presumably
granted access to specific Web sites, the librarians did not disable the filters, as the solicitor general had indicated
would readily happen. A 2008 study of all South Dakota public libraries receiving E-rate funding found that 50%
of the libraries had received requests to disable filters for specific searches. 150  The study *84  did not report
the percentage of disabling requests granted or denied. 151  The last comprehensive survey of public libraries,
conducted in 2004, indicated that only 64% of libraries said they would disable filters upon request. 152
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To determine the nature and extent of filtering disabling problems, a survey of public libraries in the United
States is needed. Surveyors should collect data on the number of disabling requests made, the number of disabling
requests granted, and the time frame in granting the requests. The Supreme Court, through Bradburn or other
challenges, may have the chance to reevaluate its decision on the voluntary nature of the provision and what
constitutes timeliness in disabling filters.
In addition to misunderstanding the disabling provision of CIPA, the Court also ignored the First Amendment
right to receive information and ideas 153  and precedent. 154  This right-to-receive doctrine is critical in public
libraries, 155  where Internet access serves as a medium for the free exchange of ideas. 156  The federal district court,
in striking down CIPA as unconstitutional, recognized the public library's mission and stated that the Supreme
Court previously had applied the right to receive doctrine to the Internet. 157  Moreover, the lower court added
that the Internet's ““unique speech-enhancing character” is derived from both a library patron's right to receive
online information and a speaker's right to communicate via the Internet. 158
*85  The right-to-receive doctrine applies to public libraries, in part, because they are autonomous institutions.
The library autonomy or professionalism principle protects the acquisition decisions of librarians from government
intervention and supports each patron's right to receive information and ideas. 159  Under the principle, librarians'
decisions on acquiring materials would not be subject to judicial challenge. Furthermore, legislation forcing
librarians to exclude material should be presumed unconstitutional. 160  First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla
advocated the concept, which he labeled the “professional principle.” Smolla writes that content decisions in public
libraries, “[S]hould be insulated from partisan political influence by committing them to the sound discretion
of professionals in the field. These professionals judge the merits of a work from perspectives limited to the
professional criteria that have evolved within their areas of expertise.” 161
Although Smolla was writing before Internet access was available in public libraries, his arguments apply to online
works. For example, the professionalism principle would give librarians constitutional status as “trustworthy
experts” in balancing the First Amendment with library management issues and concerns. 162  Under the autonomy
or professionalism principle, librarians, rather than the government, would make decisions on the use of Internet
filtering. Moreover, problems then could be resolved at the state or local level, rather than at the federal level.
Finally, the Court missed an opportunity to revise public forum doctrine. The Court could have designated Internet
access in public libraries as a fourth type of forum -- an inherent or metaphysical forum. The current public forum
doctrine is inadequate for new and emerging technologies which do not meet the criteria of either a traditional
public forum or a limited public forum. Some scholars have compared public libraries to public parks, 163  thus
viewing libraries as traditional *86  public fora 164  and places to foster public inquiry. 165  The public forum
doctrine, however, historically has focused on the rights of the speaker, rather than the recipient, and scholars
disagree on the application of forum doctrine to listeners and to the public library.
Legal scholar Bernard Bell wrote, “[T]he role of libraries for listeners may be analogized to the role of streets
and parks for speakers.” 166  He argued that the public library is a facilitator, not a channel, of government
speech. Therefore, Bell writes, “[T]he government should not have the plenary control over the material it makes
available to patrons of a public library in the same way that it may control fora in which the government seeks
to communicate its own message.” 167
In contrast, legal scholar Laura Stein wrote that online speech rights and online public spaces are not covered under
modern public forum doctrine. 168  She said that online “areas” are not likely to be considered public fora unless the
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government so-authorizes. 169  Stein wrote that contemporary public forum doctrine does not protect speech rights
in private and public media, such as the Internet and public broadcasting, adding that public forum doctrine was
more relevant in the nineteenth century, where public streets and parks served as places to speak. 170  However,
Professor Stein has argued the public has “some affirmative speech rights” in the media under the community-
centered democratic theory, 171  which “charges the government with creating communication arrangements that
offer the broader public positive opportunities to participate in public discourse.” 172
First Amendment scholar Robert Corn-Revere argued that public forum doctrine is not a good fit for libraries
because it focuses on speakers rather than listeners or readers. In a 2003 article, Corn-Revere chastised the Supreme
Court for not revising and clarifying public forum doctrine and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions 173
in the CIPA *87  case. 174  He wrote that the Court should have adopted a different theoretical framework, 175
although he did not make specific recommendations. Corn-Revere wrote that the Court should have developed a
“coherent theory for analyzing speech restrictions imposed on public institutions.” 176
Because public forum doctrine is so intertwined with freedom of speech, the Court would most likely use the
doctrine in reevaluating the Internet. The lower court, which struck down CIPA as unconstitutional, had stated
that the Internet shares many characteristics of a traditional public forum -- a place open to any member of the
public to receive speech. 177  If the Supreme Court had applied the right to receive doctrine, independent of the
right to speak, the Court could have developed a fourth type of forum applicable to Internet access in public
libraries: an inherent or metaphysical public forum with a focus on the recipient of information. More than thirty
years ago, First Amendment scholar Thomas Emerson differentiated freedom of speech from the receiving of
information, writing that there is a First Amendment right to receive and obtain communication, independent of
or supplemental to the right of the speaker to communicate information. 178  His theory would apply to Internet
access in public libraries today.
Law student Derrick Stomberg noted that the concept of an “inherently public forum” is not new, although he
did not focus on the right to receive doctrine in a 2004 law review article. Stomberg described the Internet as an
inherent or metaphysical forum, which serves as a centralized place where people can look for information and
discuss ideas. 179  Stomberg cited a 1992 concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, which focused on expanding
the traditional public forum. According to Justice Kennedy, the Court should adopt a more modern and objective
standard to the public forum doctrine, one that extends beyond the historical designation of streets, parks and
sidewalks as their role is diminishing. Justice Kennedy wrote that the Court needs to recognize the possibility
of other types of traditional public fora, “whatever their historical pedigree and without concern for a precise
classification of *88  the property.” 180  In his concurrence, written nearly a decade before the Internet was such
an intrinsic part of daily life, Justice Kennedy wrote:
Without this recognition our forum doctrine retains no relevance in times of fast-changing
technology and increasing insularity. In a country where most citizens travel by automobile,
and parks all too often become locales for crime rather than social intercourse, our failure to
recognize the possibility that new types of government property may be appropriate forums
for speech will lead to a serious curtailment of our expressive activity. 181
While an inherent or metaphysical public forum in a public library setting would support the mission of public
libraries and focus on the rights of the receiver, patrons still would need to agree to the library's policies regarding
behavior and online content being accessed, just as they do now at many libraries. In a metaphysical public forum,
any content-based regulation would be subject to strict scrutiny: The government would need to show that a
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content-based regulation, such as Internet filtering in libraries, would be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
government interest. For example, a regulation requiring minors to use filtered computers could meet the strict
scrutiny test as the government has a compelling interest in protecting minors from harm, such as exposure to
sexually explicit materials. 182  In addition, individuals who violate the law or library policies on prohibited content
can be turned over to authorities or given a verbal or written warning or a suspension from the library. Other library
policies, such as the installation of privacy screens on computers, separating adults' and children's computers, or
limiting time on computers, also could be implemented. Finally, content neutral regulations, such as blocking
all music and video downloads because of bandwidth concerns, also would be acceptable and would support the
public library's mission.
*89  CONCLUSION
CIPA's mandatory filtering requirement with the voluntary disabling clause interferes with the mission of the
public library and hinders the adult patron's right to receive information and ideas. In upholding CIPA, the Supreme
Court did not fully understand the disabling provision and erroneously applied the Spending Clause, which allows
Congress to attach conditions to programs that it funds. 183  Instead, the Court should have used the CIPA case to
update public forum doctrine and reinforce the right to receive doctrine in the context of a metaphysical public
forum -- the Internet. The designation of the Internet as an inherent or metaphysical public forum would support
the mission of the public library in providing access to information. Although the Constitution does not guarantee
individuals freedom from embarrassment or freedom from inconvenience when requesting information at public
libraries, 184  adult patrons should have open and timely access to the Internet when asking that filters be disabled.
Future research would help shed light on the exact nature and extent of filtering problems in public libraries,
including issues with disabling filters. A survey could be developed and distributed to a random sample of public
libraries, asking for the number of filtering disabling requests, the number of requests granted, and the ease with
which filters can be disabled on individual computers. In the meantime, the designation of the Internet as an
inherent or metaphysical forum would support the mission of the American public library and the First Amendment
right to receive doctrine, independent of the right to speak.
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